Who will win Poland’s crucial presidential election? by Szczerbiak, Aleks
Who	will	win	Poland’s	crucial	presidential	election?
Poland’s	presidential	election	run-off	is	on	a	knife-edge.	As	Aleks	Szczerbiak	explains,	incumbent
Andrzej	Duda	won	the	first	round	convincingly	and	remains	a	narrow	favourite	as	no	second	placed
challenger	has	ever	come	from	so	far	behind	to	win.	But	his	liberal	opponent	has	much	greater
potential	to	win	over	supporters	of	the	defeated	first	round	candidates.
Poland’s	12	July	presidential	election	run-off	is	of	crucial	importance	and	will	determine	the	shape	of
the	political	scene	until	the	next	parliamentary	poll	scheduled	for	autumn	2023.	A	victory	for	incumbent	Andrzej
Duda	–	who	is	supported	by	the	right-wing	Law	and	Justice	(PiS)	grouping,	the	ruling	party	since	autumn	2015	–
would	give	the	government	a	three-year	run	without	any	national	elections	to	continue	implementing	its	radical	state
reconstruction	programme.
However,	the	ruling	party	lacks	the	three-fifths	legislative	majority	required	to	over-turn	a	presidential	veto	so	a
victory	for	Duda’s	challenger	–	Warsaw	mayor	Rafał	Trzaskowski,	who	is	backed	by	the	liberal-centrist	Civic
Platform	(PO),	Poland’s	governing	party	between	2007-15	and	currently	the	main	opposition	grouping	–	would	be	a
disaster	for	Law	and	Justice,	seriously	hampering	its	ability	to	govern	effectively	and	possibly	precipitating	an	early
parliamentary	election.
The	election	was	originally	scheduled	for	10	May,	with	a	second	round	run-off	a	fortnight	later	if	no	candidate
secured	more	than	50%	of	the	votes.	Given	his	relatively	high	approval	ratings,	and	the	fact	that	he	was	Poland’s
most	trusted	politician,	Duda	was	widely	assumed	to	be	the	favourite.	He	made	great	efforts	to	build	up	a	strong
base	of	support	in	the	often-forgotten	parts	of	small-town,	provincial	Poland	that	constitute	Law	and	Justice’s
electoral	heartland,	which	provided	him	with	enormous	political	capital	going	into	the	campaign.	Duda’s	core	appeal
was	as	the	guarantor	of	Law	and	Justice’s	programme	of	extremely	popular	social	spending	and	welfare	policies	for
families	and	low	income	households,	who	felt	frustrated	that	they	had	not	shared	sufficiently	in	Poland’s	post-
communist	transformation,	while	simultaneously	maintaining	strong	economic	growth	and	reducing	the	state	budget
deficit.
Duda’s	biggest	weakness	was	his	vulnerability	to	the	accusation	that	he	was	a	partisan	President	who	lacked	any
political	independence	and	simply	acted	as	the	government’s	‘notary’.	In	many	ways	this	was	not	surprising	as
Duda	broadly	agreed	with	much	of	Law	and	Justice’s	critique	of	the	alleged	dysfunctionality	of	the	post-communist
state	and	its	core	institutions;	his	disagreements	were	generally	over	how	radical	reforms	should	be	and	the	best
means	of	achieving	them.	But	Duda	did	not	really	make	any	serious	attempt	to	carve	out	a	role	for	himself	as	an
independent	political	actor	able	to	transcend	the	government-opposition	divide.
Last	autumn’s	parliamentary	election	–	when	Law	and	Justice	retained	its	overall	majority	but	lost	control	of	the
Senate,	Poland’s	less	powerful	second	chamber	–	showed	how	evenly	balanced	support	for	the	government	and
opposition	was,	with	many	voters	determined	to	use	any	opportunity	to	block	the	ruling	party.	Although	polls
suggested	that	Duda	would	easily	win	the	first	round	of	voting	with	around	40-45%	of	the	vote,	the	second	round
run-off	was	always	expected	to	be	extremely	closely	fought	and	unpredictable.	The	opposition’s	strategy	was	to	turn
the	presidential	election	into	a	plebiscite	on	the	government	by	tying	Duda	as	closely	as	they	could	to	the	ruling
party.	The	danger	for	Duda	was	that	a	key	group	of	voters	who	were	positively	inclined	towards	him	personally	but
did	not	necessarily	support	Law	and	Justice	would	use	the	election	to	express	their	hostility	towards	the
government.
Changing	election	dynamics
In	March,	the	Covid-19	pandemic	changed	the	dynamics	of	the	presidential	campaign	and	initially	Law	and	Justice
benefited	from	the	so-called	‘rally	effect’:	the	inevitable	psychological	tendency	for	worried	citizens	to	unite	around
their	political	leaders	and	state	institutions	as	the	embodiment	of	national	unity	at	times	of	a	sudden	and	dramatic
external	threat.	This	strengthened	Duda	and	polls	started	to	show	that	he	could	win	a	clear	victory	in	the	first	round.
In	the	event,	the	May	election	never	took	place	because	legislation	proposed	by	Law	and	Justice	that	would	have
introduced	universal	postal	voting	to	allay	public	safety	concerns	was	not	approved	in	time	due	to	a	split	within	the
governing	camp.	Subsequently,	the	Polish	parliament	agreed	a	new	electoral	law	that	allowed	Poles	to	either	vote
traditionally	in	polling	stations	(which	would	have	to	adhere	to	sanitary	standards)	or	cast	postal	ballots	(which	very
few	chose	to	do),	and	the	first	round	was	re-scheduled	for	28	June.
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The	fact	that	Duda’s	electoral	strategy	was	premised	on	there	being	a	May	poll	meant	that	when	the	election	was
postponed	he	needed	to	re-invigorate	his	campaign.	Moreover,	as	the	‘rally	effect’	waned,	the	election	dynamics
once	again	changed	with	the	economic	slowdown	arising	from	the	pandemic	putting	pressure	on	the	state	budget
and	making	it	difficult	for	Duda	to	offer	any	substantial	new	social	spending	and	welfare	pledges.	This	forced	him	to
recalibrate	his	campaign	message	to	claim	that	Law	and	Justice	was	the	party	best	placed	to	oversee	recovery
while	protecting	families	and	low	income	households.	Duda	also	argued	that	only	his	re-election	offered	governing
stability	at	a	time	of	ongoing	epidemiological	and	economic	crisis,	saying	that	the	opposition	would	simply	use	the
presidency	to	undermine	the	government	and	sabotage	its	policies.
Rival	campaigners	at	an	event	in	June	2020,	Credit:	Krzysztof	Pacholak	/	Greenpeace	(CC	BY-ND	2.0)
The	election	delay	also	allowed	Civic	Platform	to	replace	its	struggling	presidential	candidate,	Małgorzata	Kidawa-
Blońska,	who	proved	completely	unsuited	to	a	national	crisis	situation	and	saw	her	poll	ratings	slump	to	single
figures.	Trzaskowski	is	a	much	more	formidable	campaigner	and	made	an	energetic	start,	quickly	regaining	the
mantle	of	main	opposition	challenger	and	putting	Duda	on	the	back	foot.	Although	much	of	his	initial	polling	surge
came	from	core	Civic	Platform	voters	who	were	planning	to	abstain	or	vote	for	another	opposition	candidate
returning	to	the	fold,	it	gave	his	campaign	a	sense	of	momentum.
However,	Trzaskowski’s	credibility	among	well-educated	metropolitan	voters,	which	helped	him	to	quickly	re-build
Civic	Platform’s	support,	also	gave	Law	and	Justice	an	opportunity	to	portray	him	as	embodying	the	urban	liberal
elites	that	looked	down	upon	culturally	conservative	small-town	provincial	Poland.	For	example,	as	part	of	an	effort
to	both	consolidate	and	mobilise	Law	and	Justice’s	core	traditionalist	electorate	and	highlight	the	fact	that
Trzaskowski	was	distinctly	more	liberal	on	moral-cultural	issues	than	the	average	Pole,	Duda	introduced	a	‘family
charter’	(karta	rodziny)	that	included	pledges	to	not	allow	same-sex	couples	to	marry	or	adopt	children	and	ban
propagation	of	what	Law	and	Justice	termed	‘LGBT	ideology’	in	schools	and	public	institutions.	Last	year,	in	one	of
his	first	high	profile	policy	initiatives	as	mayor,	Trzaskowski	signed	a	declaration	which	included	a	proposal	to
introduce	a	comprehensive,	LGBT-approved	sex	and	anti-discrimination	education	programme	intended	to	teach
children	about	all	aspects	of	sexuality	and	sexual	behaviour	in	the	city’s	schools	starting	at	an	early	age.
Nonetheless,	Trzaskowski	worked	hard	to	shake	off	claims	that	he	was	an	economic	and	cultural	liberal	extremist.
He	bent	over	backwards	to	re-assure	Poles	that	he	would	not	reverse	Law	and	Justice’s	popular	social	spending
and	welfare	policies,	while	sidestepping	moral-cultural	issues,	speaking	instead	in	general	terms	about	equality	and
tolerance.	Trzaskowski	also	tried	to	counter	Law	and	Justice’s	accusations	that	he	would	sabotage	the	government
by	arguing	that	the	President	needed	to	be	more	independent	of	the	governing	party	and	provide	it	with	constructive
opposition.
Wooing	the	defeated	candidates’	supporters
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In	the	event,	Duda	emerged	as	the	clear	first	round	winner,	securing	43.5%	with	Trzaskowski	on	30.5%.	Duda’s
support	was	roughly	the	same	as	Law	and	Justice’s	2019	vote	share	but	at	the	higher	end	of	the	party’s
expectations;	some	polls	had	suggested	that	he	could	fall	below	40%.	Trzaskowski	scored	better	than	Civic
Platform	did	in	2019	but	was	hoping	to	break	through	the	30%	barrier	more	decisively	and	reduce	Duda’s	lead	to
single	figures.	To	win	the	run-off,	Trzaskowski	will	have	to	increase	his	vote	share	by	twenty	percentage	points,
something	no	previous	Polish	presidential	challenger	has	managed	to	achieve.
Given	the	scale	of	this	challenge,	as	well	as	mobilising	even	more	of	his	core	supporters	(difficult,	as	the	64.5%
turnout	was	already	extremely	high	by	Polish	standards),	Trzaskowski	will	need	to	win	support	among	those	Poles
who	voted	for	other	candidates	in	the	first	round.	In	particular,	he	will	have	to	attract	the	supporters	of	the
independent	TV	presenter	and	liberal-centrist	Catholic	journalist	Szymon	Hołownia.	By	precipitating	a	shift	from
traditional	campaigning	to	political	communication	through	the	Internet	and	social	media,	the	pandemic	played	to
Hołownia’s	strengths	as	a	skilled	direct-to-camera	performer.	Although	Trzaskowski’s	entry	into	the	race	limited
Hołownia’s	scope	for	picking	up	disillusioned	Civic	Platform	voters,	he	was	still	able	to	make	an	attractive	pitch	to
the	many	Poles	who	craved	a	‘new’	non-party	candidate,	and	finished	a	strong	third	with	13.9%.
For	sure,	Hołownia’s	success	was,	in	large	part,	a	vote	against	Law	and	Justice.	By	portraying	himself	as	an
insurgent	candidate	of	change,	Trzaskowski,	whose	unofficial	campaign	slogan	was	‘we	have	had	enough!’	(mamy
dość!),	is	hoping	that	he	will	win	over	most	of	Hołownia’s	supporters.	However,	Hołownia’s	endorsement	of	the
Civic	Platform	candidate	was	heavily	qualified	because	he	also	wants	to	use	his	presidential	election	success	as	a
springboard	to	create	a	new	political	movement,	‘Poland	2050’	(Polska	2050).
Moreover,	it	is	not	clear	to	what	extent	Hołownia’s	vote	represented	a	more	general	rejection	of	the	Law	and
Justice-Civic	Platform	duopoly.	The	Ipsos	agency’s	exit	poll	found	that	31%	of	abstainers	in	the	2019	election
supported	Hołownia,	comprising	15%	of	his	total	electorate.	If	many	of	these	end	up	considering	Trzaskowski	to	be
as	much	a	part	of	the	political	establishment	as	Duda	then	they	may	simply	stay	at	home.	Law	and	Justice	is,
therefore,	trying	to	associate	Trzaskowski	as	much	as	possible	with	the	previous	Civic	Platform	governments	in
which	he	held	a	number	of	ministerial	posts	but	has,	up	until	now,	managed	to	distance	himself	from.
Duda,	on	the	other	hand,	has	better	prospects	of	picking	up	support	among	those	who	voted	for	Krzysztof	Bosak,
the	candidate	of	the	radical	right	Confederation	(Konfederacja)	grouping	who	finished	fourth,	securing	6.8%	of	the
vote.	For	sure,	Duda’s	defeat	would	serve	the	Confederation’s	narrow	partisan	interests	because	its	long-term
political	project	is	to	challenge	Law	and	Justice	on	its	right	flank.	Moreover,	Bosak’s	voters	hold	radical	free	market
views	on	economic	issues	and	Trzaskowski	has	attempted	to	woo	them	by	promising	to	veto	any	government	tax
increases	(although	he	also	pledged	to	maintain	Law	and	Justice’s	costly	social	welfare	policies).	However,	Duda’s
traditionalist-conservative	views	on	moral-cultural	issues	and	promoting	Polish	national	identity	and	traditions	are
much	more	likely	to	appeal	to	Bosak’s	supporters	than	Trzaskowski’s	cosmopolitan	social	liberalism.
On	a	knife-edge
Poland’s	presidential	election	is	too-close-to-call	with	polls	showing	the	two	main	candidates	running	neck-and-
neck.	A	larger-than-expected	first	round	victory	makes	Duda	the	narrow	favourite,	but	he	will	need	to	continue	to
mobilise	and	energise	his	voters	in	smaller	towns	and	rural	areas	where	turnout	is	traditionally	lower.	Although	no
presidential	challenger	has	ever	come	from	so	far	behind	to	win	a	second	round	run-off,	the	government’s
opponents	in	the	opposition’s	urban	heartlands	are	highly	motivated	and	Trzaskowski	appears	to	have	much
greater	potential	to	pick	up	new	voters	among	supporters	of	the	defeated	candidates.	The	key	to	the	election	could
well	be	moderate	conservatives	in	provincial	towns	who	are	wary	about	concentrating	too	much	power	in	the	hands
of	Law	and	Justice	but	like	Duda	personally	and	need	to	be	convinced	that	Trzaskowski	can	offer	a	vision	of	the
presidency	that	goes	beyond	simply	opposing	the	government.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	originally	appeared	at	Aleks	Szczerbiak’s	personal	blog.	The	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,
not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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